

**TOP SECRET**

10 December 1960

Copy No. C-2

# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



DOCUMENT NO. 35  
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ☒  
☐ DECLASSIFIED  
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C  
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2010  
AUTH: HR 70-2  
DATE: 10 JUN 1980 REVIEWER:

DIA and DOS review(s) completed.

**TOP SECRET**

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/01/20 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005400350001-3

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2004/01/20 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005400350001-3

## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

10 December 1960

### DAILY BRIEF

#### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

USSR: The unprecedented announcement that the Soviet central committee plenum scheduled for 13 December has been put off until January may reflect Khrushchev's desire for additional time, particularly in view of his current illness, to prepare for the high party gathering. This step comes on the heels of the prolonged Moscow conference of Communist parties, which discussed Sino-Soviet differences, and at a time when there are signs that important changes in agricultural administration are being contemplated. The postponement, therefore, may be indicative of some element of indecision at the top level of the Soviet Government on how these issues closely tied to the success of Khrushchev's policies should be treated at the plenum.

25X1

25X1

#### II. ASIA-AFRICA

Laos: Premier Souvanna Phouma has flown with six cabinet members to Phnom Penh, Cambodia. His further intentions are not clear. The Vientiane area remains in a state of confusion, with Captain Kong Le still in control of the city itself and with forces loyal to Colonel Kouprasith and General

Phoumi establishing a defense perimeter around Camp Chinaimo, a few miles to the south of the city. Captain Kong Le issued a blistering statement over Vientiane radio on 9 December attacking Phoumi and the "US imperialists and their Thai agents" in terms virtually indistinguishable from those used by the Communists. [REDACTED]

\*Algeria: President de Gaulle arrived in western Algeria on 9 December for a six-day tour in an atmosphere of considerable hostility. Violence and strikes erupted in Algiers and Oran. The government was prepared for trouble and has reacted firmly. By the evening of 8 December extraordinary measures had been taken, including detention of known agitators, searching of Europeans' automobiles, and surveillance of airfields. The reinforced security police had orders to fire if necessary. On 9 December, both in Oran and Algiers, the security police were effectively assisted by mechanized army units, although the government had apparently hoped to avoid using the army. Although there were general strikes in Algiers and elsewhere, no public buildings or essential utilities have been captured by the demonstrators. The government has announced that most of the 400 demonstrators arrested will be sent to internment camps. This action, coupled with the apparent lack of leadership among the rioters--the leaders of the Front for Free Algeria have "disappeared," and there are no indications that Pierre Lagaille's arrival in Algeria is imminent--may make it difficult for the rightists to regroup. [REDACTED]

10 Dec 60

DAILY BRIEF

ii

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/01/20 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005400350001-3

Approved For Release 2004/01/20 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005400350001-3

25X1

The Situation in Laos

25X1

[In the face of the mounting confusion in the Vientiane area, Premier Souvanna Phouma, members of his family and six of his ministers on 9 December took refuge in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. Press accounts of his arrival in Phnom Penh attribute Souvanna's flight to expectations that a major struggle for control of the capital was imminent between the Communist-dominated Pathet Lao and rightist forces led by Col. Kouprasith. Souvanna earlier in the day had told [ ] that he was powerless to head off impending armed strife and that he planned to fly to Phnom Penh at the first sign of a clash between Kong Le's forces in Vientiane and those of Kouprasith, located a few miles south of the town at Camp Chinaimo.]

25X1

[No fighting has apparently occurred as yet, but Kong Le's paratroopers are reported to have established themselves in a blocking position on the road between Vientiane and Camp Chinaimo. [ ] estimates that this position is manned by about 100-150 of Kong Le paratroopers, supported by 4 armored cars and an M-24 tank. He estimates that Kouprasith's force at Chinaimo consists of about 1,300 men, including 200 paratroopers taken from the pro-Phoumi garrison at Luang Prabang.]

25X1

[In an interview with [ ] on 9 December, Kouprasith expressed concern over his ability to defend his area, running from Chinaimo south to the Mekong River boundary between Laos and Thailand. He fears that the Pathet Lao may attack, either alone or in conjunction with Kong Le. Kouprasith stated that he did not at this point intend to move toward Vientiane, but was uncertain what Kong Le would do.]

25X1

[Kouprasith will shortly receive reinforcements from Phoumi, including possibly another company of paratroopers and infantry elements drawn from the Phoumi force which took Pak Sane on 8 December. Thai Premier Sarit has reportedly granted Phoumi permission to move these troops toward Vientiane on the Thai side of the river. [ ] pro-Phoumi forces in Luang Prabang have been ordered to mount an offensive against Vientiane as soon as possible; the resultant weakening of the Luang Prabang garrison would make it more vulnerable to any attack by Vientiane or Pathet Lao forces.]

25X1

[The nineteen National Assembly deputies who slipped off to Chinaimo before Kouprasith's coup on 8 December are now en]

25X1

[ route to Savannakhet from Udorn, Thailand. With about an equal number of deputies already in Savannakhet, there is now an assembly quorum making possible a vote of no confidence against the Souvanna government.]

[ Souvanna's intentions are unclear. Should he choose not to resign, from his safe haven in Phnom Penh he could conceivably challenge the legality of any assembly vote in Savannakhet on the ground that it was taken under duress. For some weeks, he has publicly been on record that his government would not recognize any action taken by King Savang in view of the fact that Phoumi's rebel committee controlled Luang Prabang. He might thus attempt to continue his government in exile and seek to focus international attention on his predicament, either through a UN appeal or through some other action.]

[ There have been indications that the bloc may try to get the Laotian situation before an international forum. On 7 December Soviet Ambassador Abramov intimated an appeal would be made to the UN Security Council and on 8 December North Vietnam issued an official statement possibly intended to provide background for any such move. In this statement, Hanoi charged that US-Thai "intervention" in Laos "threatens the security" of North Vietnam and called on participants of the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indochina to "adopt effective measures to check US imperialism." Moscow promptly rebroadcast a summary of this statement which, like those before it, also may be intended to cast an air of foreboding over the Laotian situation in hopes of discouraging support for Phoumi.]

25X1

25X1

**THE PRESIDENT**

**The Vice President**

**Executive Offices of the White House**

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

**The Treasury Department**

The Secretary of the Treasury

**The Department of State**

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

**The Department of Defense**

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Director, The Joint Staff

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

**The Department of Commerce**

The Secretary of Commerce

**Federal Bureau of Investigation**

The Director

**Atomic Energy Commission**

The Chairman

**National Security Agency**

The Director

**National Indications Center**

The Director



**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**